Th eoretical Approaches and the Complementarity Between State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes
International practice shows that neither the individual-oriented conceptual scheme nor the state-oriented conceptual scheme is, in its entirety, capable of explaining the variety of the relationship between state and individual responsibility for all international crimes.
According to a pure individual-oriented conceptual scheme as described in Part I, aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability are not only governed by diff erent sets of secondary norms but they also originate from diff erent primary norms. However, the analysis of international practice carried out in Part II reveals that such a complete separation, in particular with respect to primary norms, is not justifi ed. Among other crimes, war crimes are a clear example of international crimes prohibited under primary norms aiming at both state and individual conduct. For example, the violation of the same 'intransgressible' principles of international humanitarian law entails both state and individual responsibility. 1 But it is also possible to recall other articulations of primary norms intended to narrow, under specifi c circumstances, the scope of certain prohibited conduct, and directed at both states and individuals, such as self-defence with respect to the prohibition of aggression or belligerent reprisals with respect to certain war crimes. In such cases, the relevant conduct cannot be regarded as a breach of a primary norm and therefore it is perfectly lawful under international law independently of the fact that it has been carried out by states or individuals. Accordingly, if a certain use of force amounts to a legitimate action taken in self-defence or if a certain type of conduct represents a lawful belligerent reprisal, it cannot entail either aggravated state responsibility or individual criminal liability. In addition, international crimes are commonly collective criminal acts whose material element is established in very similar, if not identical, ways from the standpoint of both state and individual responsibility.
According to a pure state-oriented conceptual scheme as described in Part I, state and individual responsibility are not only governed by the same primary norms, they also belong to the same set of secondary norms governing the special consequences to be attached to the commission of international crimes by states. However, the analysis of international practice reveals that such a complete overlap, in particular, of secondary norms, is not justifi ed. One may recall the fact that the consequences especially provided for under international criminal law also apply to international crimes committed by private individuals and the punishment of such individuals has nothing to do with state responsibility. More generally, the functional analysis of the regimes of state and individual responsibility has shown how diffi cult it is to include a traditional criminal sanction, such as the punishment of those state organs who are responsible for international crimes, among the secondary rules governing aggravated state responsibility. In particular, these two regimes diff er as to some of their basic requirements, such as the mens rea which is a characterizing feature of international criminal law. As discussed above, even if the punishment of state organs for the commission of isolated international crimes could be regarded as a measure that, under certain circumstances, can preclude ordinary state responsibility from arising, this would not be true with respect to aggravated state responsibility, that is, the consequences to be attached to the serious breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a whole.
